Introduction [1]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) is one in a series of measures taken to address threats to the political and social order deriving from access to, or use of, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, and means of delivery. The resolution is distinct from existing treaty-based nonproliferation and arms control regime components, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) that govern the behavior of states. In contrast to these treaties, resolution 1540 in one instrument, covers all three types of weapon and reaches beyond the state to focus explicitly on the risk that non-state actors, in particular terrorist organizations bent on undermining, and in some cases supplanting, civil society might "acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery." 1540 also goes beyond existing anti-terrorism conventions that collectively impose similar though less comprehensive obligations on convention parties in that, being adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution is binding on all member states of the United Nations.

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF RATIONAL INACTION: Resolution 1540 and the Tragedy of the
Commons

This article explores the challenges of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 through the prism of the ‘‘tragedy of the commons.’’ Because implementing 1540 requires a significant investment of time and resources, the decision by states not to implement the resolution is a rational inaction for each individual state driven by self interest to maximize private gains. However, this ultimately leads to collective irrationality and the destruction of the public good, i.e., common security, leaving every state worse off.

This question has preoccupied Britain’s foreign policy makers since the end of the Second World War, and perhaps more so since the end of the Cold War.

Post 1989 has brought new debates about Britain’s role in the world. Our traditional enemies have been replaced by worldwide terrorist networks, raising the question of how do we deal with this new enemy? This conflict is like no other. Terrorist networks have built training and organisational facilities in unstable states such as Afghanistan. Our response in such cases has been to use hard power and remove the regimes, drive out the militants and promote democracy.

The Lotus & the Dragon: The Evolution of the BJP’s China Policy

Vijay Vikram
Research Intern, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has since its inception, projected itself to the electorate as a nationalist party that promises the ‘vigorous’ pursuit of India’s national interest and one that seeks a more assertive role for India in the international system as befits ‘its great and ancient civilisation’ Nationalist overtones characterise all aspects of the party’s discourse. While populist slogans such as “Shaktishali Bharat ke liye Shaktishali BJP” (A Strong BJP for a Powerful India) may not serve as accurate indicators of policy positions, they do point to an explicit consensus from the party’s brain trust to its grassroots karyakartas (workers) on the ideology of nationalism as the guiding principle of the party.

Pentagon officials have prepared a new estimate for defense spending that is $450 billion more over the next five years than previously announced figures.

The new estimate, which the Pentagon plans to release shortly before President Bush leaves office, would serve as a marker for the new president and is meant to place pressure on him to either drastically increase the size of the defense budget or defend any reluctance to do so, according to several former senior budget officials who are close to the discussions.

Experts note that releasing such documents in the twilight of an administration is a well-worn tactic, and that incoming presidents often disregard such guidance in order to pursue their own priorities.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has since its inception, projected itself to the electorate as a nationalist party that promises the ‘vigorous’ pursuit of India’s national interest and one that seeks a more assertive role for India in the international system as befits ‘its great and ancient civilisation’ Nationalist overtones characterise all aspects of the party’s discourse. While populist slogans such as “Shaktishali Bharat ke liye Shaktishali BJP” (A Strong BJP for a Powerful India) may not serve as accurate indicators of policy positions, they do point to an explicit consensus from the party’s brain trust to its grassroots karyakartas (workers) on the ideology of nationalism as the guiding principle of the party.

La situación actual en las relaciones entre Rusia y los paises occidentales no estan a lo mejor. El reconocimiento de las dos regiones de Abjasia y de Osetia del Sur por el gobierno ruso explica en parte la razón. Pero no es la única. Otras razones pueden ser evocadas.

Una de la màs importante es la configuración que empieza de caracterizar la seguridad y la defensia alrededor de Rusia. Hacen muchos años que la tendencia de una "Otanisacion" de Europa se propaga. Numerosos paises aspiran a entrar en la Organisación Norte Atlantica. Evidentemente, la Georgia forma parte de " esos "candidatos. Ahora, es un interlocutor privilegiado. La hemorragia empieza a ser grande por Rusia. Perdió muchos de sus aliados del antiguo bloque comunista con la entrada en 2004 de los tres Países Bálticos la Estonia, Letonia, Lituania y también de paises como Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia. Pero es la segunda vez que la hemorragia se manifesta. La primera fue en 1999 con la entrada de la Polonia, la Hungría y la Républica Checa. Por fin, es necesario de notar que muchos paises que forman parte del URSS, son ahora partenarios privilegiados del OTAN. La necessitad de estar en la Organisación se explica por el medio del espectro soviético. Los Estados piensan que ser miembro del OTAN los protegerán de todas tentativas de influencia y de invasión de la Rusia.

The African continent is quickly becoming a proxy battleground for Washington and Beijing, as the latter's appetite for emerging markets and raw materials grows. In July 2008, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "China's full court press to establish influence and connections in Africa and Latin America may be seismic in its future implications for the United States." China's burgeoning influence in Africa is now squarely on the Pentagon's radar screen. In October 2007, the United States affirmed its commitment to the continent by announcing the establishment of a new combatant command: Africa Command, known by its acronym in defense circles as AFRICOM. While Washington policymakers deny that Beijing's behavior is the rationale for its establishment, it appears as though AFRICOM marks the beginning of a new containment strategy aimed at curtailing Chinese power and influence in Africa. Since October 2007, AFRICOM was operating under the auspices of U.S. European Command, but last week, on October 1, AFRICOM officially became the Defense Department's tenth unified combatant command.

Introduction
In April 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1673. The resolution
extended the 1540 Committee’s mandate for an additional two years and
invited the committee to “explore with States and international, regional
and subregional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learned
in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), and the availability of
programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540”.[1]
In February the following year the Security Council debated ways to
enhance implementation of 1540 and again expressed the need to further

Democrats in Congress are beginning to push back against plans to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps, signaling that they will protect the sophisticated weapons systems that constituents and contractors value in the upcoming debate over resources.

The call for smaller personnel numbers by senior Defense appropriators and authorizers comes at a time when the Defense budget faces a crisis, with rising obligations to pay for new weapons systems colliding with the mounting cost of maintaining an all-volunteer force.

The tension between funding people or weapons programs feeds into the larger defense community discussion over whether to invest limited resources in preparing for equipment-centric conventional conflicts or the counterinsurgency wars that the U.S. military is now fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.