The current financial crisis has significantly impacted Asia. Not surprisingly, this weekend, its not a G-8 meeting, but a G-20 meeting, including India, China and Brazil.

Before the crisis erupted, India and China were being touted as the new "dream economies." For a while after the magnitude of the crisis started becoming evident, the economies of both countries showed some resilience, prompting commentators in Asia to point out the de-linkage in the global economy. "De-linkage" refers to a strain of thought that argues that the fate of the global economy, especially the Asian economies, is no longer inextricably linked to that of the U.S. economy.

Introduction [1]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) is one in a series of measures taken to address threats to the political and social order deriving from access to, or use of, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, and means of delivery. The resolution is distinct from existing treaty-based nonproliferation and arms control regime components, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) that govern the behavior of states. In contrast to these treaties, resolution 1540 in one instrument, covers all three types of weapon and reaches beyond the state to focus explicitly on the risk that non-state actors, in particular terrorist organizations bent on undermining, and in some cases supplanting, civil society might "acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery." 1540 also goes beyond existing anti-terrorism conventions that collectively impose similar though less comprehensive obligations on convention parties in that, being adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution is binding on all member states of the United Nations.

The past two months have seen some interesting developments in Sino-Indian relations. Immediately after India’s official entrance into the group of nuclear states sent shudders through the nonproliferation community worldwide, the latest round of discussions between the Asian giants came and went with little fanfare. Taken together, these developments further confound rather than illuminate understanding of the lurching relationship between the world’s two most populous states.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Congress approved a deal that allows American companies (like General Electric and Westinghouse) to sell India atomic fuel and nuclear technology. A month before Congress made the deal official, member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had waived the usual restrictions to entry into the elite club, warmly welcoming India as the newest nation to openly possess nuclear weapons; this despite the fact that India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The move landed with a whimper in the U.S. media, but has made a huge splash in Indian news, where the event was largely celebrated as something of a coming out party—India, no longer the shy debutante. Others took notice too: companies in Canada, France, and Russia are salivating at the opportunity to sell nuclear-related material to India, a country once denied such privileges.

The Lotus & the Dragon: The Evolution of the BJP’s China Policy

Vijay Vikram
Research Intern, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has since its inception, projected itself to the electorate as a nationalist party that promises the ‘vigorous’ pursuit of India’s national interest and one that seeks a more assertive role for India in the international system as befits ‘its great and ancient civilisation’ Nationalist overtones characterise all aspects of the party’s discourse. While populist slogans such as “Shaktishali Bharat ke liye Shaktishali BJP” (A Strong BJP for a Powerful India) may not serve as accurate indicators of policy positions, they do point to an explicit consensus from the party’s brain trust to its grassroots karyakartas (workers) on the ideology of nationalism as the guiding principle of the party.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has since its inception, projected itself to the electorate as a nationalist party that promises the ‘vigorous’ pursuit of India’s national interest and one that seeks a more assertive role for India in the international system as befits ‘its great and ancient civilisation’ Nationalist overtones characterise all aspects of the party’s discourse. While populist slogans such as “Shaktishali Bharat ke liye Shaktishali BJP” (A Strong BJP for a Powerful India) may not serve as accurate indicators of policy positions, they do point to an explicit consensus from the party’s brain trust to its grassroots karyakartas (workers) on the ideology of nationalism as the guiding principle of the party.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM has it that India lacks a foreign policy strategy or doctrine; that is, some sort of overarching framework within which a set of prioritised foreign policy objectives, widely accepted as being in the national interest, can be accomplished. Several analysts have pointed to parliamentary bickering on issues such as the India-US nuclear agreement, competing visions of the national interest articulated by various political parties, and conflicting statements by senior leaders as evidence of a fractured, disorganised and inchoate foreign policy.

However, many of these perceived shortcomings can be attributed to other factors—India's notorious bureaucratic blocks, widespread political opportunism, and frequently contradictory and ambiguous government rhetoric —rather than actual foreign policy schizophrenia. Moreover, this argument is predicated upon a scarcity of information and derives from taking public statements at face value, rather than a careful analysis of India's foreign policy track record.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM has it that India lacks a foreign policy strategy or doctrine; that is, some sort of overarching framework within which a set of prioritised foreign policy objectives, widely accepted as being in the national interest, can be accomplished. Several analysts have pointed to parliamentary bickering on issues such as the India-US nuclear agreement, competing visions of the national interest articulated by various political parties, and conflicting statements by senior leaders as evidence of a fractured, disorganised and inchoate foreign policy.

However, many of these perceived shortcomings can be attributed to other factors—India's notorious bureaucratic blocks, widespread political opportunism, and frequently contradictory and ambiguous government rhetoric —rather than actual foreign policy schizophrenia. Moreover, this argument is predicated upon a scarcity of information and derives from taking public statements at face value, rather than a careful analysis of India's foreign policy track record.

In opposing January 2007’s Iraq troop surge plan, Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama cited the need for a political solution rather than intensified military action. Now, 18 months later, even after the Surge’s successes have vindicated its supporters, Sen. Obama continues to play up political measures and play down military action as the proper focus for U.S. policy in Iraq.

Sen. Obama also asserts that U.S. involvement in Iraq has diverted resources away from Afghanistan. His solution is to withdraw forces from Iraq and send two combat brigades – approximately 7,000 troops, a mere fraction of the troops withdrawn – to Afghanistan. Given Sen. Obama’s intention to stabilize Afghanistan with a larger troop presence, one would expect him to employ a more robust force.

Nonetheless, having deemphasized the military’s role in creating progress in Iraq – and having been embarrassed by the surge policy’s impressive successes – Sen. Obama now over-emphasizes the potential of a “surge” in Afghanistan to address the central problems there.

Reconstruction and stabilization operations in Afghanistan are not primarily undermined by a lack of U.S. forces. The main problem results from the safe haven that Taliban and pro-Taliban forces enjoy in Pakistan’s frontier regions and tribal areas. No troop increase will be sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan if the problems in Pakistan are not mitigated.

The wave of terror attacks earlier this summer in India has brought delayed attention to Islamist militant activity in the country. While international media focused only briefly on the bombings, their brutality is comparable to the outrages perpetrated in Madrid and London. More than 100 people were killed in the serial blasts in three cities in north, west, and south India in May and July. These attacks sit in a continuum with serial blasts in New Delhi and Mumbai in 2005 and 2006. India's position in a volatile region further compounds the threat. No other democracy grappling with Islamist terrorism must also cope with neighbours like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, all of which are home to intensifying Islamist violence.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Threat to American Interests in Central Asia? ABSTRACT With the apparently rising, Chinese-led, and Russian-supported Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) attracting increased attention in Washington, a question arises as to the level of danger the bloc poses to U.S. objectives for Central Asia. Is it a threat to U.S. interests in the region or largely irrelevant to those interests? To what extent does the nascent SCO currently pose a challenge, and secondly, what developments should the policy community track to assess the SCO as it relates to U.S.