In navigating the path back towards the negotiating table—a path that is fraught with strategic and political peril at every turn—the Israelis and Palestinians are facing a significant leadership deficit. Richard Haass captures this well in his latest op-ed, “The Gipper’s Mideast Playbook,” in the Wall Street Journal editorial page (not exactly the most friendly environment for a pro-peace process agenda). But dressing up any idea as the brainchild of Ronald Reagan is bound to win you an audience and perhaps plaudits with even the most hostile of conservative audiences. And in this case, Haas does an excellent job of reminding us of both the strategic import of a peace deal to the United States as well as the essential role we can play.

He argues that the Israeli-Palestinian impasse is not one of substance—the majority of all sides and decision makers recognize the details of a peace deal over ’67 borders, refugees, and sharing of Jerusalem will fall roughly in line with the parameters of the Geneva prescription—but rather one of sequencing and leadership deficit. With both Israeli and Palestinian leaders' credibility and political lifelines on the ropes (notably Olmert and Abbas), neither side can proceed without being able to spin any forward movement as a political win for their constituents. And to break this impasse requires a third-party with a megaphone powerful enough to overcome the sequencing and leadership hurdles by providing political cover to both sides and to move the goalposts of discussion from “practical measures” to more substantive ones. Failing this, the most deafening silence will be that of the US.

Haass writes:

What is needed now is for President Bush to take a page out of Ronald Reagan's playbook and spell out his vision for Middle East peace. Such a vision must include but not be limited to what was pledged to Sharon. In particular, any change in territory from the 1967 lines given to a new Palestinian state needs to be offset by compensation, i.e., land swaps. Generous financial help would be forthcoming to resettle the bulk of Palestinians prepared to live in the new Palestinian state. The Palestinians would gain a foothold in Jerusalem and Muslims would gain authority over their holy places. Israel would agree not to create new settlements or carry out targeted killings while this was being negotiated. In return, all armed attacks by Palestinians on Israel would need to stop. Palestinians would recognize Israel and agree that the struggle against it was over.

If much of this sounds familiar, it is because it is. There is very little new under the sun when it comes to viable Middle East peace plans. The failure at Camp David in the last year of the Clinton administration was not one of ideas but of leadership (or a lack of it in Yasser Arafat's case) and orchestration (not enough was done to create a political environment in which Arafat could be confident he could compromise and receive political support from Arab states and the economic support of the developed world).

The reason to restate these ideas in public now is not to convene leaders at Camp David or anywhere else to negotiate. Rather, it is to bring about Palestinian and Israeli leaderships that could make peace. This could involve new leaders, or existing leaders adopting new positions [emphasis added]. A U.S. plan would give President Mahmoud Abbas the means to challenge Hamas. He could argue he could deliver a viable state without violence. Hamas would have to sign on or risk being defeated at the polls.

Similarly, an American plan would give Mr. Olmert a second chance. He could back the U.S. plan and run with it, or it would become the basis for an election that could produce a new Israeli government able and willing to work with the U.S. Only once such leadership was in place on both sides would negotiations begin.

This would all take some time. There would be setbacks. It might not happen on this president's watch. Nevertheless, articulating a Bush Plan would underscore U.S. support for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in a detailed way for the first time -- something that would change debates in the area and create the possibility that one day the sides could return to Camp David with a very different result to show for it.