Last Thursday soon after Hamas declared victory over Fatah forces in the Gaza Strip, Martin Indyk proposed a strategy of politically and financially supporting Fatah in the West Bank while isolating Hamas-controlled Gaza until it withered under unbearable pressure. Surely then, the logic goes, the Palestinians would recognize that freedom-loving Fatah-land was far superior to Hams-istan. This “West Bank first” notion got picked up by former chief negotiator Dennis Ross who is often a weathervane for key decision-makers inside the administration and Congress. Ross suggested we apply the screws to Hamas to make life worse in Gaza while ensuring the West Bank emerge as a model of success to Palestinians and the region at large. If this all sounds familiar, it is because we’ve been down this road before. Isolation was roughly the strategy deployed against Hamas after its stunning electoral victory 18 months ago and it arguably compounded the security dilemma landing us in the pickle we are in today.

In fact, some journalists have even speculated that Hamas’s takeover of Gaza might have been allowed or even orchestrated by Fatah to escape the straitjacket imposed on the Hamas-led unity government.

During the press conference yesterday, both President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert subscribed to this isolation strategy implying an opportunity for closer relations with Abbas, Fatah, and the West Bank.

My colleague and Director of the Middle East Policy Initiative Daniel Levy expressed skepticism in a New York Times piece over the administration’s approach:

Daniel Levy, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and a former Israeli peace negotiator, said the American move to back Mr. Abbas “looks suspiciously like there’s an effort afoot to reimpose single party rule on the Palestinian body politic.”

In fact, not long after the dust had settled from Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, Levy warned that the emerging “Isolate Gaza” strategy might actually backfire.

And yesterday, Rob Malley and Aaron David Miller also set out to deconstruct the logic of the “Isolate Gaza” position. They argue the “West Bank first” proposal rests on a set of faulty assumptions: 1) that Fatah has substantial control over the West Bank, 2) that Hamas has no influence over the West Bank, and 3) that President Abbas can govern the West Bank at the expense of Gaza with impunity. They go on to make a compelling case for why trying to isolate Hamas and Gaza is a prelude to another disaster:

Since Hamas's election in early 2006, the United States and its allies have behaved as though isolating the Islamist movement could undo its victory and that supporting Fatah politically and militarily would hasten that outcome. The wreckage of that policy is clear. Yet, having witnessed the consequences of those myths, they are hastening to adopt others. Efforts to deepen the split between Hamas and Fatah or between Gaza and the West Bank will compound the disaster, for there can be no security, let alone a peace process, without minimal Palestinian unity and consensus.

The United States and others should support Abbas and encourage progress in the West Bank, but smartly. Sticks for Gaza coupled with carrots for the West Bank will divide Palestinians, radicalize Gazans, provoke violence by those who are left out and discredit those the United States embraces. Dividing Palestine geographically is no more a recipe for success than dividing Palestinians politically.

Ultimately, Abbas will have to find a may to manage relations with Hamas and the Gaza Strip. In the meantime what should the US do? Sometimes less is more argue Malley and Miller:

The diplomatic equivalent of the medical precept is do no harm. Since Hamas's electoral victory, U.S. policy has helped strengthen radical forces, debilitate Palestinian institutions, undermine faith in democracy, weaken Abbas and set back the peace process. Why ask for more of the same?