Abstract: Russia’s new president, Dmitry Medvedev should be expected to broadly continue his predecessor Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy toward Turkey and the broader Black Sea region. Analysts that cast Medvedev as a mere Putin puppet or those that forecast a gradual increase in power for the new man in the Kremlin miss the crucial question about decision-making in Russia: how much strength will the siloviki – the current and former security service officers – wield to implement policies based largely on mistrust and calculation? The substance of Russia’s poicies in the Black Sea region will likely change little in substance, but may adopt a more subtle, effective style under Medvedev. Despite recent significantly improved relations with Russia, over time, Turkey may find itself in an uncomfortable position between its Western allies and its new-found friends in Moscow.

Winston Churchill once famously said ‘I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’. While it takes enormous courage to attempt that which Churchill deemed he could not accomplish, the implications of Russia’s May presidential transition hold great potential importance for Turkey and the broader Black Sea region, so some analytical forecasting is warranted.

Vladimir Putin’s two terms as Russia’s president have seen the country bounce back from an uncertain and dispiriting period during the 1990s. Now, Russian foreign policy seems as confident as ever, especially in the broader Black Sea region – part of the country’s so-called ‘near abroad’. Overall, former First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s anointed successor as President, inaugurated May 7, should be expected to continue this trend, but may do so through a more subtle approach.

Forecasting the Enigma

Analysts of the Kremlin transition can roughly be split up into two schools. While both see Medvedev and Putin governing in ‘tandem’, as stated, at first, there are those who emphasize Putin’s enduring cult of personality and then those who underline the inherent power of the office of the presidency in Russia. Both are also quick to point out that Russian political tradition, and the highly-centralized, increasingly authoritarian system of governance created during Putin’s two terms, mean the prospect of true power-sharing is very unlikely.

The ‘Putin power’ school reads the tea leaves as indicating that while a new man may be occupying the Kremlin, he is very much Putin’s man. While maybe not a puppet, Medvedev will have to seek final approval from a powerful prime minister. They point to moves by Putin in the last months of his administration that subtly shifted and consolidated a domestic power structure under a more independent premier. As promised, Putin did not blatantly ensure a third term by changing the constitution to give more powers to the office of prime minister, but he signed a presidential decree obligating all of Russia’s powerful governors report to the White House as opposed to the Kremlin. Governors in turn now have more control of local administrations, and it is widely believed that Putin’s ‘envoys’, who split oversight between seven Russian regions will continue to report to him.

Putin will also head the country’s increasingly dominant United Russia Party, while retaining the loyalty of Russia’s behemoth security services – domestic and foreign. The Putin cult grew in popularity and propaganda during the last stages of his presidency, even to the point of his being labeled a ‘national leader’ on the model of Turkey’s Ataturk. These are signs of enduring power, the thinking goes, and speculation abounds that Putin is planning a return to the presidency after a single or truncated Medvedev term.

The ‘Kremlin power’ school argues that while Medvedev was very much Putin’s protégé, once he finds his hands on the reigns, he will slowly but surely drive the horses in his own direction. The initial power tandem is clearly split along foreign and domestic lines, and as Medvedev finds himself seated at the G8, defines reassessed relationships with the European Union and a new U.S. president, and holds the post of commander in chief, complete with the keys to Russia’s nuclear arsenal, he will inevitably emerge as the dominant figure of the pair. In fact, Putin’s domestic role may allow Medvedev to deflect criticisms of lingering problems at home, such as rising inflation and stepped-up energy costs.

While perhaps not significantly divergent from Putin’s, many point out that Medvedev has plans of his own. He will carefully populate the Kremlin with supporters that will not only serve to realize his vision, but will shore-up his political support amongst key positions and stakeholders. The institutional weight of the presidency will eventually be brought to bear. Medvedev will have to take his time in balancing Russia’s major interest groups, but once he has established himself as the ‘center of gravity’, it will be difficult to challenge the authority of the Kremlin. Some in this school point out that Medvedev’s gradual takeover of effective power may be an agreed, well managed process. It may well be encouraged by a Putin who is said to harbor plans for a rich retirement, once he sees his country in competent hands.

While both schools touch on important points, they both fall prey to an inordinate focus on the two political personalities of Putin and Medvedev. While the individuals themselves – and their personal ambitions – are key, it is also worth remembering that as ever, individuals represent factions and trends within Russia’s decision-making circles. Despite the increased centralization of power during Putin’s tenure, it would be inaccurate to analyze Russian politics and policy through the prism of one man. In other words, Russia is not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and even unlike the parliamentary or presidential systems of Western democracies, Russian presidents since the end of the Cold War have only been able to pick their decision-making coteries to a limited extent.

This is even more the case since Yeltsin’s tumultuous tenure , in that the last eight years have witnessed a deep and wide-ranging ‘securitization’ of the Russian state. This has meant increased focus on the ‘strength’ of the nation, popular preoccupation with the military and its capabilities, but most of all, the growth and elevation in status of the security services, both foreign and domestic. With half the population of the Soviet Union, Russia still maintains the same amount of intelligence and security service members – by far the largest per capita in the world. And, as many have pointed out the post-Yeltsin period has seen the growth in decision-making power of the ‘siloviki’: current and former security service officials, with former KGB operative Putin at their helm.

The role of the siloviki is paramount when analyzing the recent presidential transition, if only because Medvedev is not one of them, but also because his closest confidants are not thought to come from their ranks, and his team may harbor ambitions which diverge from the policy priorities born of securitization. Many siloviki will move to the White House with Putin, and their domestic power base will likely be strengthened. However, it was clear to Kremlin-watchers that the movements in preparation for the presidential transition shook-up the siloviki ranks, pitting some against others in arguments over the best way to maintain control of Moscow’s decision-making levers.

The worldview of intelligence and security service members (in almost all countries, not only Russia) is one of mistrust and calculation. Within Moscow, this worldview is manifested in a desire to control the key organs of power. Therefore, while Medvedev will appoint and consult his confidants – many of them former St. Petersburg lawyers like himself – it should be assumed that certain siloviki factions will attempt to retain control over the so-called power ministries, covering national security, internal security and law enforcement. However, it should not be assumed that Putin will always be their man. Ongoing internal power struggles and jockeying with other powerful interest groups may well produce another figure, such as the virtually unknown Putin in the late 1990s. It may also keep Medvedev’s assumed pre-transition rival, former KGB operative and First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov, in the picture as a competitor-in-waiting.

Implications for Turkey

The consequences of the silovik worldview for Russia’s foreign policy have become increasingly clear during Putin’s second term. Mistrust and calculation lead to balance of power thinking, the conceptualization of relations in Eurasia through spheres of influence and geopolitical jockeying. Due to Russia’s self-proclaimed status as an ‘energy superpower’, state-controlled energy interests – with Medvedev as the chairman of the largest: Gazprom – have been brought to bear as effective tools in furthering Russia’s influence in its ‘near abroad’, in Europe and in broader Eurasia – Turkey included.

While Washington, Brussels and other European capitals have felt the sting of such policies, Ankara’s interests have for the first time in centuries been accommodated by Moscow, particularly as a way of keeping Western influence and institutions out of the Black Sea region. Putin’s administration has taken full advantage of Turkey’s cooling relations with the Bush administration over Iraq, and with the EU over Europe’s non-committal approach to Turkish membership, to set aside traditional geopolitical differences and forge strong energy, economic and rhetorical links across the Black Sea. These have allowed Turkey to explore alternatives to its Cold War role on the front line of NATO, but they have also allowed Russia to undermine Ankara’s plans to be Europe’s energy hub, and have weakened budding Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Medvedev is thought to espouse ideas for a foreign policy approach that would employ more subtle pressure and tools of influence than that witnessed under Putin. Targeted investment, a focus on securing control over energy infrastructure and the leverage of personal and business ties to achieve policy aims make up his preferred approach in broader Eurasia. At the same time, in order to stave off any significant internal challenge from the siloviki, Medvedev will likely not diverge from some more confrontational policies regarding the West. Despite its focus of late on internal political affairs, Ankara has so far been able to balance relations with Washington, Brussels and Moscow so that all remain on workable levels. However, while Moscow may gradually shift its approach, Medvedev’s continuation of zero-sum policies towards the West may leave Turkish decision-makers stuck an uncomfortable in between.

Implications for the Black Sea Region

Turkey’s relations with Russia are inevitably shaped by Moscow’s approach to the greater Black Sea region – much of which makes up Russia’s so-called near abroad. Again, this approach will likely be defined by a continuation of the Putin administration’s siloviki-led zero-sum policies towards the West and its growing ties in the region, but over time, Medvedev may seek to implement such policies in a more subtle, and perhaps more effective manner. That said, the region’s hot spots are best analyzed individually.

Moscow’s approach to Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has garnered the most popular attention in recent months – likely because it has been the most openly confrontational, and because it has met significant opposition from Tbilisi. Moscow’s official ties to the two enclaves not under Tbilisi’s control were significantly strengthened after a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) – the first step toward membership – was not extended to Georgia at the Alliance’s April 2008 summit at Bucharest. The subsequent flap between Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s government and Putin’s outgoing administration over a spy drone likely shot down by a Russian fighter over Abkhazia only served to highlight the tense relations between the two countries, certainly not improved by long-term tacit Russian support for Georgia’s separatists and vocal opposition to Tbilisi’s Western ambitions. Medvedev will likely continue to see Georgia as a key bellwether for the region, and continue, if not step-up pressure to force Saakashvili into a compromise, or scare a disinterested Europe and a preoccupied U.S. into avoiding the separatist issue, and thus Georgia altogether.

Ukraine, also denied a MAP at Bucharest, presents a similar case to Georgia in its geopolitical significance for Russia. On an emotional level, however, with its major Russian-speaking population and as the birthplace of historical Kievan Rus, Ukraine’s importance for Russian decision-makers surpasses that of Georgia. That said, Moscow holds far greater leverage within Kyiv’s interest groups and decision-making circles than it does in Tbilisi’s. At the same time, Medvedev’s approach to Ukraine will likely be more cautious than his predecessor’s. Moscow overreached and was burned during Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ and as he stated publically before the Bucharest summit, Medvedev is keenly sensitive about the Ukrainian population’s suspicion of NATO. Watch Moscow try to sustain that sentiment before NATO foreign ministers discuss MAPs again in December 2008.

Moldova and its separatist region of Transnistria has so far suffered the neglect of both the West and Russia. Despite its close proximity to EU and NATO members, its strategically significant Russian weapons depo and its historical and cultural ties to neighboring Romania, low-lying notionally communist President Vladimir Voronin has so far not pursued a strategy that would engender greater links with any particular outside power, and has not put any vigor behind resolving his country’s festering frozen conflict. This situation has so far suited Russian decision-makers just fine, as any change in the status-quo would undeniably cause a headache for Moscow. Medvedev may look to increase Russian investment and control of strategic infrastructure and industries in Moldova, so that when European capitals come to the realization that the governance black hole and uncertain status of Transnistria facilitates trans-national threats to European populations, Moscow will hold a formidable bargaining chip on the EU’s border.

One place where a Medvedev administration may attempt a policy shift – not just a shift in approach – is in its relations toward Armenia and Azerbaijan. As Baku increases its ties to Europe and applies pressure through international and Western institutions to resolve the frozen conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia will likely attempt to curry favor with Ilham Aliyev’s administration. Armenia’s dependable and growing ties with Russia allow Moscow room for maneuver with Azerbaijan without upsetting relations with Yerevan. Putin tested Baku’s receptivity last year when he suggested the Russian-leased Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan might make up part of a joint U.S.-Russian missile defense system. Having secured the Western support needed to realize the first stage of the East-West Transport Corridor: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, Baku’s foreign policy priority is now resolution of Karabakh. Medvedev may seek to increase Russia’s influence – energy and otherwise - in Azerbaijan and the broader Caspian by quietly supporting Baku’s case within the Minsk Group – the OSCE body that overseas negotiations on Karabakh, chaired by the U.S., France and Russia.

Enduring Policies?

On the face of it, a Medvedev Kremlin may not look much different from the decision-making body of the last eight years, but internal shifts and counter-shifts within Moscow may engender restrained, yet noteworthy changes in Russia’s policy approach to Turkey and the greater Black Sea Region. Keenly aware of the internal and external challenges that lie before him, Medvedev should be expected to attempt a smooth transition from policies carried out according to a silovik worldview, to ones which although they seek to accomplish the same goals, may do so utilizing more subtle levers. How far he can or will stray from a foreign policy based on mistrust and calculation remains to be seen.

Turkey’s relations with Russia may well grow during Medvedev’s tenure, but Ankara may also come across a limit to how much it can side with policies that seek to exclude its NATO allies and undermine its Western-leaning Eurasian friends in the broader Black Sea Region. Even as EU-skeptical sentiment increases in Turkey, growing trade, energy and transport ties bind it to Europe and the broader West. These will likely provide a steady anchor for Turkey even as it risks sailing side by side with an enigma in the Black Sea’s waters.

Alexandros Petersen is Program Director of the Caspian Europe Center, Brussels and Adjunct Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.