China-Pakistan: An unholy nuclear alliance

A deal which would further erode non-proliferation ideals was placed on a backburner by China, during the recent visit of Pakistan President Asif Zardari to Beijing . Zardari, who wished to develop a nuclear trade agreement with China as a rival to the Indo-US nuclear agreement had to return with a fraction of what he desired. A similar deal for Pakistan, which is outrightly rejected by the United States, would further sully the proliferation history of the Chinese-Pakistan partnership. It is in the interest of the non-proliferation regime that Pakistan is denied a chance to argue the Indian deal is a precedent for itself and further pressure should be applied on China to improve its own proliferation record.
Pakistan argued that the deal provides India with previously denied nuclear fuel and therefore would result in a significant boost to the Indian nuclear strategic program, and would escalate tensions in the region leading to an arms race. Former Pakistan President Musharraf even made a passionate plea for the United States to show Pakistan parity with India in order to placate domestic elements, who were increasingly viewing Pakistan as a slave to American interests. It was particularly embarrassing for the Pakistani ruling class to see arch rival India being a benefactor, even though it was the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia . President Bush however rejected any similar treatment to Pakistan, bluntly pointing out the different histories of India and Pakistan on nuclear proliferation.
China also views the Indo-US deal with a great deal of skepticism and has viewed the growing Indo-US military and economic bonhomie with concern that it is an alliance to counterweight its regional power. Although, China and India have embarked upon detailed negotiations to resolve outstanding border disputes and economic relations have been improving, there continues to be a great mistrust of Chinese motivations within the strategic community in India. China too, has undertaken double speak on its relations with India, including a statement from its Ambassador questioning territorial disputes with India. Underlying mistrust of India’s power ambitions have forced China to adopt a strategic alliance with Pakistan, which has included proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to the country.
China-Pakistan relationship
For China, Pakistan is essentially a surrogate army. Owing to traditional military rivalry, India has for decades maintained a Pakistan centric strategic policy which keeps its military tied up and limits its options against China. According to Husain Haqqani, of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India”. “For Pakistan, China is a high-value guarantor of security against India.” In this mutually beneficial friendship however, owing to Pakistan’s limited strategic capability against India, China is essentially a needed ally, while China does not necessarily rely on Pakistan.
China-Pakistan relations are diverse, and the Chinese have a strong investment presence in Pakistan. According to Jing Huang, senior fellow in Asia Studies at the Brookings Institution, “Pakistan would welcome investments from China more than anywhere else because Chinese are our brothers and time-tested friends”. The two countries have cooperated on a variety of large-scale infrastructure projects in Pakistan, including highways, gold and copper mines, major electricity complexes and power plants, and numerous nuclear power projects. Pakistan helps China on a range of issues, including “providing intelligence, fighting terrorism, and repairing relations with the Muslim world”.
However, this strategic relationship has adopted a sinister dimension of proliferation of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. Commercially, as China began its economic reform and opening up in the early 1980s, defense industries and arms exporting companies were under tremendous pressure to tap into the lucrative international arms market. Pakistan became a valued customer for Chinese arms. Finally, given US concern about and emphasis on missile proliferation issues, Beijing has also found it useful to exploit them as bargaining leverage in dealing with Washington on issues important to China: US arms sales to Taiwan, TMD deployment in East Asia, among others. American intelligence reports have alleged that China has transferred complete M-11 missiles, missile related technology, and manufacturing assistance to Pakistan.
The M-11 is a single stage, solid fueled missile with a reported range of 290 km and a payload of 800 kg. While technically the M-11 missile does not fall within the MTCR parameter, they have the inherent capability of being able to deliver a 500 kg payload over 300 km. The fact that China has resisted joining the MTCR as a formal member, coupled with its ambiguous interpretation and implementation of its bilateral commitments with the United States, raises questions as to the seriousness of Chinese commitment to arms control and nonproliferation.
Significantly, some news reports suggest Chinese security agencies knew about Pakistani transfers of nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. China also had longstanding ties with Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, and head of an international black market nuclear network. "The Pakistani nuclear program is largely the result of Sino-Pakistani relations" says Huang.
China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in the early 1980s. The United States government and many Western analysts believe that China assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives prior to its accession to the NPT in 1992. In 1983, US intelligence agencies reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons. China also reportedly helped Pakistan operate its Kahuta uranium-enrichment plant. According to media reports the amount transferred was enough for making 10 nuclear weapons
China also provided assistance and transferred dual-use materials that could be applied in the development of nuclear weapons. Beijing insists that China's assistance involved the provisions of peaceful technical information rather than weapons-related technologies or materials. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang, nuclear energy cooperation between China and Pakistan is “absolutely for peaceful purpose.”
China allegedly involved Pakistani scientists in a nuclear test at its Lop Nur test site in 1989. On December 31, 1991, China signed a contract to build the Chashma 300-MW nuclear power reactor for Pakistan, and has agreed to build an additional three more reactors Chasma II (which is already under construction) and Chasma III and Chasma IV (III and IV are to be contractually agreed upon).
Beijing has adopted a number of measures to improve its proliferation image including publicly adopting responsible nuclear export policies after joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and furthered its commitment by acceding to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. In addition, Beijing has formally enunciated three principles governing its nuclear exports: (1) acceptance of IAEA safeguards; (2) peaceful use only; and (3) no re-transfers to a third country without China's prior consent.
In 1993 China and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement to apply IAEA safeguards to a Chinese nuclear power station sold to Pakistan (INFCIRC/418). In 1994, China reportedly turned down a Pakistani request to “correct” Pakistan's nuclear weapons and to use the Chinese Lop Nur testing range.
In recent years, China has also promulgated domestic laws regulating nuclear and dual-use exports. It has also played a highly constructive role in the six party talks in restricting the North Korean nuclear weapons program and also international efforts in curbing the Iranian nuclear program. Beijing, while advocating a nuclear deal for Pakistan, has indicated that a more detailed study of the Pakistani request would be needed by the Chinese leadership.
However, significant concerns continue to emanate out of Chinese exports, particularly to Pakistan. In 1995, a major controversy erupted over suspected sales of 5,000 specially designed ring magnets from the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to a non-safeguarded Pakistani nuclear laboratory, which was allegedly involved in nuclear weapons work. China initially denied that the sale had taken place; a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the reports “groundless” and warned the United States not to impose sanctions based on “rumors.” Pakistan also denied that any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology had taken place. However, in talks with US officials, China eventually privately admitted that the sale had taken place, but argued that China should not be penalized for two reasons. First, China insisted that CNEIC had arranged the sale without the knowledge or consent of the central government. Second, China argued that the ring magnets were not magnetized, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List only covers ring magnets magnetized at a specific tolerance.
Suspicions of sensitive technological transfers resurfaced in August-September 1996, when reports indicated that China had agreed to sell a special industrial furnace and high-technology diagnostic equipment to a Pakistani nuclear facility, equipment which reportedly can be used in the construction of nuclear bombs. The reports were dismissed by the Chinese and investigators could not find sufficient evidence against China.
The May 1998 tests by Pakistan in response to similar tests by India, further fuelled suspicions over Pakistan’s nuclear program. While scientists claimed it to be an indigenous test, many commentators allege that the tests could not have been possible without the explicit help of China. In response to Pakistan testing its nuclear weapons, China practically laid all blame on India. According to a statement from the foreign office “The present situation in South Asia has been caused solely by India. India conducted nuclear tests in disregard of strong opposition by the international community.”
In February 2001, the press reported that China's Seventh Research and Design Institute, which is overseen by the China National Nuclear Corporation, supplied 50 ceramic capacitors to Pakistan's New Labs plutonium reprocessing plant. The Institute was reportedly paid through a bank account maintained by an official at the Pakistani embassy in Beijing. The Chinese-supplied Khushab reactor can generate enough plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon per year, and probably more.
According to US think tank Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Pakistan is close to increasing several-fold its ability to make weapon-grade plutonium through developments at Khushab. The Khushab nuclear site in Punjab province originally consisted of one heavy-water reactor with a power of about 50 MW and a heavy water production facility. Details about the construction of the second and third reactors emerged in 2006 and 2007. “No electricity production equipment is seen in the (satellite) images. This is consistent with the purpose of the reactors being to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons,” the report said.
Chinese proliferation activities during the eight years of the Clinton administration resulted in Chinese entities subject to sanctions 17 times. In four years of the Bush administration, Chinese entities have been sanctioned a total of 50 times. In 2004 alone, 14 Chinese entities were sanctioned a total of 23 times.
Five companies—China Great Wall Industry Corporation, China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation, China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), Wha Cheong Tai Company, Ltd., and Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant—and one Chinese national, Q.C. Chen, have all been sanctioned at least four times by the United States and are often referred to as “serial proliferators” by U.S. officials
For some entities, such as the China Great Wall Industry Corporation and China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation, the sanctions have been spread out over more than a decade. But for NORINCO and Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, the sanctions have all occurred since 2003 and 2002, respectively.
Wider proliferation circle
Chinese proliferation to Pakistan has indirectly fuelled weapons activities across the world, especially owing to the role of disgraced Pakistan nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. In 2004, as a result of on-site investigations into Libya's nuclear weapons program new details of the Pakistan-China collaboration were studied. As part of disarmament inspections, early Chinese nuclear weapons designs were handed over to IAEA inspectors by Libyan scientists, wrapped in plastic bags bearing an address in Islamabad.
Several recent developments have once again highlighted not only the central role that Beijing in developing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, but also Dr. Khan's intimate links with China's nuclear establishment. According to Professor Mohan Malik of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, “the Chinese seem to have been thoroughly beaten in the proliferation game by their own clients and allies - Pakistan and North Korea”.
Reacting to reports about the Khan nuclear network, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged Islamabad to undertake the investigations “properly” and bring them to a conclusion “quickly.” Professor Malik, draws attention to the Chinese preference for conducting investigations “properly” and ending them “quickly”. This, he argues, reveals Beijing's apprehensions over exposing the Chinese nuclear establishment's long standing ties with Khan. Mallik argues that Khan’s numerous visits to China's nuclear installations over the last three decades and gains accrued to China's weapons program from the Dutch centrifuge technology stolen by him in the mid-1970s are particularly sensitive issues for Beijing. A senior member of the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) told a Pakistani journalist that “Chinese officials had expressed a desire for the proliferation inquiry to end quickly as they feared that Dr. Khan would publicly detail his network's ‘China connection,’ thereby embarrassing a crucial ally that Pakistan considers a strategic counterweight to India.”
Although the bomb designs sold to Libya were of a 1960s Chinese vintage, an analysis of Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear tests reveals that China may have supplied more advanced nuclear weapons designs of the late 1980s and early 1990s to Pakistan, which may have been shared with other countries. The close cooperation between Chinese and Pakistani military agencies also leaves little doubt that the Chinese had greater knowledge about Khan’s proliferation activities than is publicly reported.
Pakistan: Nuclear fears
There has been a growing fear among western nations over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, particularly over fears that the volatile country would possibly lead to weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Earlier this year, IAEA director El Baradei, expressed his fear that “nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of an extremist group in Pakistan or in Afghanistan.” Pakistan’s poor proliferation record with its top nuclear scientist indicated for proliferation to regimes in Libya, North Korea and Iran have further fuelled western fears.
Consistent reports indict Pakistan’s military intelligence of close ties with terrorist organizations. There have also been linkages of top Pakistan nuclear scientists with extremist groups and this has led to strong suspicions that the arsenal is in unsafe hands, and therefore should be safeguarded or destroyed at the earliest. It is in this regard, that the United States has been strongly skeptical in pushing forward for a nuclear deal with the country.
Significantly, the one nation, which would have the greatest fears over the safety of the Pakistan nuclear facilities, is unperturbed. Indian National Security Advisor, K Narayanan has said that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are largely in safe hands. According to him, “I would say it (Pakistani nuclear arsenal) is relatively safe or I would say it is largely safe.” He said that apprehensions about Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling in the hands of radicals has led to the US paying "very close attention" to the concerns, and added that India already has a contingency plan in place to deal with a situation of nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands and getting used by elements in Pakistan.
This was reiterated by States Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, when he said “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is in safe hands” and that the United States would help Pakistan. According to Gurmeet Kanwal, director for the Center for Land Warfare Studies, India, “The Pakistani military authorities are extremely concerned about such eventualities and have made elaborate arrangements to ensure that all their nuclear warheads are stored safely. They claim that carefully formulated personnel, reliability policies and electronic safety mechanisms have been developed and incorporated by Pakistan's Nuclear Command Authority.”
Articulating the difficulties a rogue organization would have in getting control of nuclear weapons, he adds “The Musharraf regime has ensured that hard-line radical elements are ruthlessly weeded out from the nuclear security detail. Hence, it can be concluded that if some rogue elements were to try to gain control over the nuclear warheads, they would have to be prepared to fight their way through several layers of highly motivated personnel who are armed to the teeth.”
Could these measures satisfy China into accepting a nuclear deal for Pakistan and dismissing global concerns surrounding any nuclear transfer to Pakistan?
Chinese view
Beijing’s national security strategy is a principle of “containment through surrogates” , that requires proliferation to countries that can countervail its perceived rivals and enemies. The Chinese military has long practiced what John Mearsheimer calls “managed proliferation”- it calls for providing nuclear or missile technology to China's friends and allies (Pakistan, Iran, North Korea) so as to contain its rivals through proxies (India in South Asia, the United States in the Middle East and Japan in East Asia). Toshi Yoshihara and Richard Sokolsky elaborate, “Beijing has relied on the threat of proliferation as a counterweight to U.S. policies that threaten China's interests.”
According to Professor Richard Russell of the National Defense University, “China works against American counter-proliferation policy until they get caught, and then deny charges, only to subsequently, and much belatedly, recant to say that it will not happen again.”
China views with great concern the Indo-US strategic partnership, and actively continues to balance its opposing goals of counter weighting India and yet developing friendly relations with it. In order to do so, it finds it expedient to engage in a double speaks. For example, Chinese leaders were supportive of the Indo-US deal, yet engaged in nearly fatal delaying tactics during the NSG vote. On realizing that its opposition would be futile, it engaged in hopes that the NSG would address “the aspirations of all parties”, an obvious reference to Pakistan. Privately, Chinese officials admitted that Pakistan was on their back in opposing the India specific waiver, and pointed out to angry Indian officials that it did not come in the way of blocking the vote.
However, China has far more significant leverage over Pakistan and cannot be bullied into adopting a pro-Pakistan stance. An example of this was witnessed during the recent red mosque crises in Pakistan. In response to violence against Chinese workers in Pakistan, Musharraf made the following statement: “The Chinese, who are such great friends of ours - they took the Chinese hostage and tortured them. Because of this, I was personally embarrassed. I had to go apologize to the Chinese leaders, "I am ashamed that you are such great friends and this happened to you”.
Conclusion
The Chinese position for equal opportunities to Pakistan in the nuclear field would appear to be to provide leverage against the United States in particular and India in general. Already, the view within Pakistan is that the deal which India has is discriminatory. According to the head of Awami Muslim League Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, ‘the western world is not mentally ready to see Pakistan as nuclear power therefore it is being targeted’. In a statement, the Pakistani Ambassador to the UN Zamir Akram, told the UN General Assembly’s First Committee that “policies that create nuclear disparities in our region and reinforce the discriminatory approach towards Pakistan can only contribute to exacerbating strategic asymmetries that would destabilise the entire region and indeed the world.”
However, on the premise that a similar deal would be provided to Pakistan by China, it hailed the IAEA safeguards agreement for India as a precedent. Regarding continued missile technology transfers and assistance to Pakistan, Beijing's motive may be more strategic than commercial. Islamabad has remained an important factor in Beijing's strategic calculations regarding South Asia and a useful counterweight to India.
There continues to be a lot of suspicion about Pakistan’s nuclear program, and with A.Q Khan’s recent outbursts against the Pakistan government and the government’s refusal to allow his interrogation by western investigators, questions continue to surround Pakistan’s nuclear integrity. Coupled with the reported proliferation history of China, Pakistan would find it extremely difficult to obtain a NSG waiver like that obtained for India. India faced considerable opposition from non-proliferation flag bearing states including Ireland and New Zealand. Pakistan with its dubious history would be building castles in the air hoping for a deal akin to India. Compounding Pakistan’s nuclear woes would be the aspersions cast on its army and intelligence for links with terrorist attacks in India and Afghanistan. With fears that there exists a sever dichotomy between civilian and military leadership, Pakistan would continue to fuel distrust and misgivings about its nuclear security.
In this light any move by China to bolster the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan in any form or manner would be construed as a destabilizing measure and invite international ire. Non-proliferation would be an immediate victim and international nuclear security efforts would be undermined. Pakistan has far too many demons to face before it can rely on even its traditional ally.