Analysts are concerned that recent Islamist trends in Ankara could threaten the long-standing amicable relations between Israel and Turkey. These fears were highlighted by legislation passed in Turkey on Feb. 9, which rescinded a law in the constitution banning the wearing of a traditional Islamic headscarf. However, in June Turkey's high court overturned this ruling, claiming it violated separation of religion and state. Turkey is governed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), whereby Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the prime minister and Abdullah Gul is the president. Erdogan and Gul share pro-Islamist beliefs that clash with the secular nature of the majority of Turkey's political and military establishment. Some Israelis fear that Erdogan and Gul could seek to steer Turkey closer to the Muslim and Arab world at the expense of Israel. However, religious ideology does not seem to compromise Turkey's relationship with Israel. Nonetheless, two issues that transcend the political and religious affiliation between Ankara and Jerusalem include the violence between Israelis and Palestinians and the fate of the Kurdish people. Secular and religious Turkish leaders have at times condemned Israeli actions against Palestinians, because the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict places Turkey in an uncomfortable situation. While the government seeks acceptance from the European Union and admires liberalism and democracy, as a Muslim nation, Turkey will always share a special commitment toward the Muslim world. Therefore, Israeli and Palestinian fighting continues to be a polarizing factor in the relations between the two nations. Turkey was governed by secular leaders from 2002 until 2004, and Ankara displayed an almost exclusively pro-Palestinian posture. In April 2002, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem condemned Jerusalem for its violations of human rights and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit called Israel's treatment of Palestinians as "tantamount to genocide." Turkey joined other Muslim nations at a United Nations General Assembly hearing in 2003, denouncing Israel's construction of a security fence designed to prevent Palestinian suicide bombers from entering Israel. The Kurdish issue also generates friction between Turkey and Israel, as it is alleged that Israel would support an independent Kurdistan in Iraq. This rationale stems from the theory that the Kurds, a non-Arab Middle Eastern people, could serve as another ally for Israelis in the predominately Arab Middle East. Israel has had a history of alliances with non-Arabs in the region, namely Muslim Turkey, Christian factions in Lebanon, and the Pahlavi regime in Iran. The notion of a three-state federal republic in Iraq (one of them being Kurdish) would be extremely disquieting to Turkey, as this could inspire Turkey's Kurds to unilaterally declare their own state. Most Israelis are opposed to maintaining good relationships with a small and weak Kurdish state at the expense of Turkey. It is far more sound policy to sustain relations with the sovereign, democratic, and pro-Western republic of Turkey (a NATO member since 1952) than to take the risk of assessing the outcome of an independent Kurdistan. Iran would most likely try to exert a sphere of influence over an independent Kurdish state, and that is something Israel and Turkey would like to avoid. Ankara's Islamist orientation has not compromised Israeli-Turkish cooperation. In fact, relations between the two nations show signs of improvement. By the end of 2005, Turkey became Israel's leading trading partner in the Middle East, importing $900 million in Israeli products and exporting $1.2 billion in products to Israel. In April 2005, Turkey purchased nearly $200 million in military technology from Israel, and in the following month Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon approved 17 new joint Israeli-Turkish military projects. In November 2007, Turkish and Israeli officials discussed the sale of the Arrow ballistic missile defense system and a model of the Ofek spy satellite to Ankara. The Islamist ideology of Erdogan and Gul may cause some dismay among Israelis, but it appears that will not tarnish the close cooperation between the two countries. Erdogan and Gul both seek Turkey's admission into the European Union, and all EU members maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Turkey would have no choice but to follow the status quo of the EU if nominated. Since Ankara wishes to join the European continent and be regarded as part of the European community, the prospect of Erdogan and Gul attempting to delegitimize the secular, democratic nature of the Turkish political system is remote. Will Turkey's AKP pro-Islamist government alter its good relations with Israel? Not likely. It seems pragmatism and regional issues outweigh religious sensibilities. The biggest challenges facing Israel and Turkey will be how they handle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kurdish aspirations for independence. If Turkey and Israel wish to remain the superpowers in the region they must continue the practical path of friendship and cooperation. As a Muslim superpower in the Middle East, Turkey has the clout to mediate peace talks, as it is currently doing between Israel and Syria. Turkish and Israeli cooperation also has the potential to offset a partitioned Iraq, which could destabilize neighboring states and cause more chaos and violence in the region.