The debate over China has been heating up most recently with finger-pointing over lax food safety provisions, accusations of currency manipulation, and a growing concern—evidenced by their tiptoeing around the Sudanese government and Darfur—that China will not become a responsible stakeholder in the global order. And while some have taken that as a cue to swap engagement for confrontation (see the Baucus-Graham-Grassley-Schumer currency legislation) an article in The National Interest penned by professor Steve Weber and two of his graduate students contends that the binary choice of engaging or confronting China entirely misses what is actually taking place: rather than join our liberal internationalist order—one created and framed by the US post-WWII—China is seeking to build its own international order, a “A World Without the West”.

Despite the most recent Pew Global Attitudes Project report released last week which revealed a continued decline of the US image around the world, it also suggests real opportunities for the US to make in roads with Middle East public opinion. The Pew report noted that while the US export of ideas (including democracy) were generally disliked throughout the world, especially in the Middle East, the region was surprisingly supportive of the American way of doing business:

American business is also relatively popular in the Middle East, especially in Kuwait (71% like U.S. business practices), Israel (70%), and Lebanon (63%). Even among Jordanians (51%), Egyptians (48%), Moroccans (44%), and Palestinians (40%), favorable views of American business are far more common than positive views of the U.S. as a country or of the American people.

Last Thursday soon after Hamas declared victory over Fatah forces in the Gaza Strip, Martin Indyk proposed a strategy of politically and financially supporting Fatah in the West Bank while isolating Hamas-controlled Gaza until it withered under unbearable pressure. Surely then, the logic goes, the Palestinians would recognize that freedom-loving Fatah-land was far superior to Hams-istan. This “West Bank first” notion got picked up by former chief negotiator Dennis Ross who is often a weathervane for key decision-makers inside the administration and Congress. Ross suggested we apply the screws to Hamas to make life worse in Gaza while ensuring the West Bank emerge as a model of success to Palestinians and the region at large. If this all sounds familiar, it is because we’ve been down this road before. Isolation was roughly the strategy deployed against Hamas after its stunning electoral victory 18 months ago and it arguably compounded the security dilemma landing us in the pickle we are in today.

Anyone trying to understand the seeds of sectarian conflict in Iraq should read Nir Rosen’s response in the Washington Post to L. Paul Bremer’s Sunday op-ed. (As an aside, Rosen also had the cover of the New York Times Magazine this past weekend with his vividly detailed story of Iraqi refugees who—despite the 2 million who’ve fled the country and the 1.9 million internally displaced—have disappeared from our line of sight). Rosen’s primary strike against Bremer’s approach to Iraq is the unbelievable lack of knowledge-paired-with-hubris displayed in positing ourselves as savior to the Iraqi Shiites without beginning to understand the complex social and bureaucratic dynamics on the ground. And in likening Saddam’s Iraq to Nazi Germany, the oversimplified dichotomy that cast Sunnis as the aggressors and Shiites as the victims resulted in a series of colossal blunders and gave rise to the sectarian conflict we see today. But after reading Rosen's piece, I'm struck by how we are replaying this erroneous aggressor/victim construct in our national dialogue over Darfur.

In navigating the path back towards the negotiating table—a path that is fraught with strategic and political peril at every turn—the Israelis and Palestinians are facing a significant leadership deficit. Richard Haass captures this well in his latest op-ed, “The Gipper’s Mideast Playbook,” in the Wall Street Journal editorial page (not exactly the most friendly environment for a pro-peace process agenda). But dressing up any idea as the brainchild of Ronald Reagan is bound to win you an audience and perhaps plaudits with even the most hostile of conservative audiences. And in this case, Haas does an excellent job of reminding us of both the strategic import of a peace deal to the United States as well as the essential role we can play.

Last week former Senator Edwards, seeking to link the fight against world poverty to the more politically salient security paradigm, echoed what a number of well-intentioned humanitarians have espoused. Edwards—who is not the first to make this argument (others include Howard Dean and President Bush) but has certainly raised its profile—argued that poverty sewed the seeds of terrorism while failed states and societies played host to terrorists. Yesterday the Union Leader dismissed Edwards’s “quasi-Marxist” remarks arguing “terrorism is fueled by ideology.”

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime recently released a new report based on recent field research done in late 2006 on Afghan opium cultivation. Though the report’s findings could prove immensely useful and instructive for a Congress and administration set to pass a war supplemental with more funding for Afghanistan, it will likely be ignored. A press release with summary findings can be found here and the full report here but I thought I’d quickly sketch out what I think are some key findings below:

Though not a frequent consumer of the National Review, I’m always on the prowl for new reading materials and happened upon the recent cover story by former Senator Jim Talent calling for a much larger defense budget—boosting the FY2007 budget by $34 billion and increasing the defense budget from 3.8% to 4% of GDP indefinitely—for modernizing and replacing equipment, new procurements, and expanding the armed forces. Possessing little knowledge of the procurement and readiness process, I found Talent’s case, steeped in budget figures and historical comparisons, to be somewhat compelling. Coincidently, on the date Talent’s piece was published, the Washington Post highlighted a paper studying how well the U.S. military is suited to modern warfare, also termed fourth-generation or asymmetrical warfare, which was recently presented to the American Political Science Association and soon to be presented at West Point.

A new report by released by the Center for American Progress titled “Contain and Engage” claims to offer a novel approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions that breaks out of the constraints of other proposed avenues, those being—an incoherent “muddling through,” non-military regime change efforts, a pre-emptive military strike on its nuclear facilities, and a grand bargain. The report claims that the fifth option, to “contain and engage,” is the only viable approach to achieving our aims of a nuclear-free Iran. But in fact the report seems to short-change the grand bargain option and fall short on detailing a containment strategy.

The terms “surge” and “grand bargain” appear to be the latest indispensable rhetorical allies to Washington foreign policy circles seeking to advance diverse, and often incongruous, range of ideas. The latest instance seeks to counterbalance the Bush administrations’s “surge” strategy in Iraq with an “economic surge.” Fareed Zakaria makes the case for greater economic support that could counteract Iraqi unemployment and poverty by providing 150,000 much needed jobs for a sum so vast it amounts to the same cost of supporting our military deployments in Iraq…for twelve hours.