While Pakistani counterterrorism strategists wrestle with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the northwest tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda successfully applies strategic chaos to achieve its goals. Promoting religio-political and economic instability in Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond, Al-Qaeda -- in sharp contrast to the appeal, capabilities and goals of past terrorist groups -- does not believe in eternal peace after a long, hard, bloody war. Instead, Al-Qaeda envisions a world held hostage to constant conflict where chaos delivers "perpetual chaos" until the Day of Judgment. Strategic chaos defines and supports Al Qaeda's goals, modus operandi and longevity. Victory against Al-Qaeda and affiliates rests upon understanding, exploiting and finally discrediting their doctrine of strategic chaos.

From South Asia to North Africa, Al-Qaeda and affiliates, abetted by numerous self-multiplying splinter cells, proliferate like bacteria in environments ripe for ethnic and sectarian, xenophobic separatism. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas provide such an environment. In FATA, Al-Qaeda wants to strengthen its base to drive out Pakistani troops, endanger the new Pakistani government through terrorist attacks if it objects, successfully evict US forces from Afghanistan; and make Pakistan and Afghanistan the first members of a growing, war mongering nuclear-armed Islamist Empire.

Knowing all too well the enormous task that lay ahead of them, Al-Qaeda's founders tied their organisation's success to the freedom of their operatives to carry out loosely defined directives. Avoiding past traps of going after well-defined enemies such as the armies of the United States or Israel Al-Qaeda defined its enemy generously – any infidel, including most Muslims, anywhere in the world became fair game.

Strategic chaos worked. Tactical advantage over conventional armies became clear in Afghanistan and Pakistan after Al-Qaeda applied a successful combination of short-term shocks -- suicide bombings and targeted killings -- and long-term roadblocks -- sustained insecurity leading to socio-economic decline. Things became worse for reluctant hosts such as Pakistan when hundreds of young, politically marginalised, economically disenfranchised and madrasa-trained Pakistanis became eager recruits for Al-Qaeda. Whatever their beef with Kabul, Islamabad or Washington Al-Qaeda had something for everyone -- familial bond, political prestige, financial largesse, military expertise, etc. -- and all of that with a major discount in exchange for a safe haven. In a nutshell, today's Al-Qaeda operates with little or no central authority, no rigidly defined strategies, and through splinter groups with de facto operational control -- doctrine of strategic chaos.

However, strategic chaos has its shortfalls. Sometimes splinter groups interpret directives so loosely that their actions are not even remotely in tandem with Al-Qaeda's worldview. For example, in Anbar, Iraq, and in Swat Al-Qaeda and affiliates overstayed their welcome by public displays of vigilante justice. Encouraging local rebellion against Al-Qaeda and affiliates produces sustainable stability and is much more effective than military action alone. Instead, as the recent history of counterinsurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan has shown, short-sighted brute force against Al-Qaeda makes it stronger over time due to increased local support and battleground knowledge.

Second, to rival Al-Qaeda's burgeoning media campaign, Washington and Islamabad should fight back hard. Paradoxically Al-Qaeda wants to "purify" Pakistan by implementing "dirty" tactics such as inducing fear through public hangings, collecting ransoms for kidnappings, and filling its coffers with drug money. Making pervasive such blatant inconsistencies between Al-Qaeda's message and action must be an important component of winning the population's "hearts and minds."

Instead, for most of the last six years, Islamabad and Washington have fought Al-Qaeda's strategic chaos by drafting and implementing chaotic strategies. That is like throwing lighter fluid into fire. Due to US interagency disconnect, groupthink, and lack of US-Pakistani provincial and local government cooperation, Pakistan lacks a coherent counterterrorism strategy.

In late 2006, however, the US State Department, the Department of Defence and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) did begin coordinating and monitoring their strategies. In the autumn of 2007, General Ashfaq Kayani followed suit by shifting the focus from brute military force to increasing local support, law enforcement and human intelligence.

Policymakers in Islamabad and Washington should build on these positive steps by expanding policy focus to all elements of national power, especially public diplomacy and political reconciliation. While Al-Qaeda's demagoguery bodes well with the disenfranchised of northern Pakistan, rhetoric alone cannot produce bread or butter. Using all the resources of the federal and provincial governments Pakistan must employ a rigorous economic stimulus package, do away with discriminatory and parallel legal systems, and give genuine political recognition and hope to the denizens of FATA. Only then can Pakistan hope to "win" back those led astray by Al-Qaeda's delusions of redemption.

The writer is an independent policy analyst and an adjunct fellow at Spearhead Research, Lahore, headed by General (retd) Jehangir Karamat. Email: haider.mullick@gmail.com